A RUSSIAN-WESTERN SECURITY COMMUNITY?
Possibilities and obstacles

WILHELMSEN Julie

FFI/RAPPORT-2002/04917
A RUSSIAN-WESTERN SECURITY COMMUNITY?
Possibilities and obstacles

WILHELMSEN Julie

FFI/RAPPORT-2002/04917

FORSVARETS FORSKNINGSINSTITUTT
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
P O Box 25, NO-2027 Kjeller, Norway
A RUSSIAN-WESTERN SECURITY COMMUNITY?
Possibilities and obstacles

The report is an attempt to outline a theoretical framework for the FFI project “Russia-partner and challenger.” It presents two central theoretical contributions to the understanding of the concept “security communities,” namely those of Karl Deutsch, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. According to these theories two or more states constitute a security community when it is unthinkable to use large-scale violence to solve conflicts between them. Preconditions for such a security community are relations of mutual responsiveness, a set of common values and, often, institutional integration. In the report we also suggest how these theoretical propositions can be applied to the Russian-Western relation. On the basis of the theoretical propositions we present the different case-studies that the FFI project will produce and what questions we need to address when analysing the Russian-Western case. The development of a security community between Russia and the West will depend on the ability of the West to be responsive to Russian interests and needs. But it will also depend on the development of liberal-democratic norms in Russia and an increase in transactions between Russia and the Western states in organisations such as NATO and EU.
CONTENTS

1 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 7
  1.1 Introduction 7
  1.2 Karl Deutsch: 8
    1.2.1 Definition 8
    1.2.2 Conditions 9
  1.3 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett 10
    1.3.1 Definition 10
    1.3.2 When does a security community exist? 10
    1.3.3 Conditions 10

2 THE RUSSIAN-WESTERN CASE 12
  2.1 Determination and precipitating conditions 14
    2.1.1 Determination 14
    2.1.2 Precipitating conditions 15
  2.2 Background conditions 16
    2.2.1 Power and responsiveness 16
    2.2.2 Compatibility of major values 17
  2.3 Process conditions 20
    2.3.1 Transaction density 20
    2.3.2 International organisations and social learning 21
  2.4 Indicators 22
  2.5 Model 24

3 CONCLUSION 24
  References 25
  Distribution list 26
A RUSSIAN-WESTERN SECURITY COMMUNITY?
Possibilities and obstacles

1 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Introduction

The concept “security community” will form the core of the FFI-project “Russia-partner and challenge” because it can help us address the following question: Can we foresee a relationship between Russia and the West where the use of force is unthinkable? If the answer were yes, it would have major implications for the organization of Western forces in general and Norwegian in particular.

After 11 September 2001 Russia and the West share vital security interests. The possibility of a long-term strategic coalition therefore exists. Such a strategic coalition could with time develop into a Russian-Western security community. However, as the conflict in Kosovo proved, the failure to find acceptable compromises on difficult issues can lead to a serious backlash in Russia or the West, and hamper the development of good relations. Further, the development of a Russian–Western security community would not only depend on whether interests collide or coincide, but more fundamentally on whether a growth in mutual trust, identity and norms between Russia and the West occurs.

Security community has been a controversial concept in the international relations-debate (IR). One reason for this is that it contradicts many of the basic assumptions in realism, which has been the dominant theoretical perspective in IR from the end of Second World War through to the late 1980s. Whereas the use of force to solve conflicts between states in the international system is considered an ever-present threat in the realist perspective, the concept security community implies that groups of states can become so integrated that war amongst them is unthinkable. Further, the earliest conceptualizations of security communities contained various theoretical and methodological problems and failed to produce a robust research agenda. Despite these controversies the concept has acquired new relevance after the end of the cold war and the theoretical assumptions underpinning this concept have been elaborated on and improved by scholars.

The FFI-project will analyze Russian policy and the Russian–Western relationship in order to assess the possibilities of a future Russian-Western security community. This will be done through various case studies both of the direct Russian-Western relationship and of the Russian-Western relationship as mirrored in interactions in Russia’s periphery to the South, the West and the North. The case studies will be guided by the theoretical propositions that follow from the concept of security communities and these theoretical propositions are outlined in this report.
The theoretical framework in this report draws selectively on the different theoretical propositions in the literature and is adjusted to serve as a tool to study the specific case of the Russian-Western relation. The framework will identify both necessary conditions for, and probable obstacles to, the building of a security community between Russia and the West. We will also suggest indicators of growing identity and trust between Russia and the West.

In the following we shall start out by presenting first Karl Deutsch’s theoretical propositions (Deutsch, 1966) and then Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett’s revised version of Deutsch’s concept (Adler and Barnett, 1998). The last chapter outlines how we will apply these theoretical propositions to the Russian-Western case.

1.2 Karl Deutsch:

1.2.1 Definition

The concept security community was coined by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s and presented the idea that communication processes and the density of transactions across borders in the modern world foster shared identities across borders. As a result of this states can “become integrated to the point that there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.” By integration Deutsch understood “the attainment within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population.” The term peaceful change meant “the resolution of social problems, normally by institutional procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force” (all quotes above from Deutsch, 1966:2.)

Although Deutsch concentrated his effort on analysing amalgamated security communities, characterised by the merging of former independent units into a single unit, he also analysed pluralistic security communities. In pluralistic security communities the states retain their independence of separate governments. It is the latter that is relevant for our study.

One term in Deutsch’s definition seems important to elaborate on before we go any further. That is his understanding of a “sense of community” (Deutsch, 1966:17). A sense of community is not a matter of static belief in a limited number of common propositions, but rather a dynamic relationship of mutual trust and loyalties and agreement that common social problems can and must be solved by processes of peaceful change. The members of a security community partially identify in terms of self-images and interests, but the key factor is mutual consideration, attention, communication, perception of needs and responsiveness in the process of decision making. In other words it is the very nature of the relationship as a process that is the essence of a security community.
1.2.2 Conditions

Deutsch found that a security community only comes about if it is striven for as a distinct and specific goal. In other words, states with a high density of interaction between them do not automatically develop into security communities; they need a certain *determination* to forge a security community.

According to Deutsch the outcome of the integrative process among groups of countries is determined by a) background conditions that change slowly and b) the dynamics of the particular integrative political process and c) the interplay of the effects of a) and b). Deutsch illustrates this by showing how capabilities matter for the formation of security communities: Stronger and more advanced political units form cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative process develops. Size, power, economic strength, administrative efficiency etc. gives capacity to act and overcome external obstacles. However, this capability is not much worth when fostering a security community, if the core state does not have the capability of “responsiveness.” Responsiveness refers to the ability of the core-unit to control its own behaviour and redirect its own attention so as to receive communications from the other political units, which were to be prospective partners. It refers to the ability to give their messages adequate weight in decision-making and perceive and respond to their needs (Deutsch, 1966:19-21).

Deutsch finds that two background conditions are important for the formation of a pluralistic security community.

1) Compatibility of major values held by the politically relevant strata of all participating units and relevant to political decision-making. (Sometimes supplemented by a tacit agreement to deprive of political significance any incompatible values that might remain)

2) The capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages and actions quickly, adequately and without resort to violence. Such capabilities for political responsiveness required in each participating state a great many established political habits and of functioning political institutions, favouring mutual communication and consultation.

Deutsch points out that the transition from background to process is fluid. The essential background conditions do not come into existence at once, or in a fixed sequence. Rather, they may be assembled in any sequence, so long as they come into being and take effect. Further, Deutsch points out that at a certain point background and process becomes one. Indeed, when reading Deutsch it seems difficult to distinguish background from process. It seems unclear how one would identify these variables independently from each other in the research. However, Deutsch’s main propositions, both concerning the need for a certain determination on the side of both parties to form a security community and the importance of common values and responsiveness as background conditions, seem fruitful when analysing the Russian –
Western relationship. We shall incorporate them in the framework for our project. Before that however we will look closer at the attempts to refine Deutsch’s theoretical propositions.

1.3 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett

1.3.1 Definition

Adler and Barnett (1998) have elaborated on Deutsch’s concept of security communities with the aim of generating a more viable research program for studying pluralistic security communities. In line with Deutsch they define a pluralistic security community, as “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler and Barnett, 1998:30). Peaceful change is defined as “neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes” (ibid. 34).

Adler and Barnett further distinguish between loosely and tightly coupled security communities. A shared structure of meanings and identity, the practise of self-restraint and no expectation of bellicose activities characterize the former. The latter, in addition to the characteristics of the former, has a “mutual aid” society in which they construct collective system arrangements and a post-sovereign system with national, supranational and transnational institutions. The loosely coupled security community suggests that security communities can exist without any well-developed strategic ties or a formal alliance.

1.3.2 When does a security community exist?

A security community exists when behaviour suggests the renunciation of military violence (this was the indicator Deutsch suggested). The other indicator Adler and Barnett propose is the existence of a crude “governance structure”: deeply entrenched habits and practises of the peaceful resolution of conflicts and shared norms on which they are based. Governance can best be defined as activities backed by shared goals and inter-subjective meanings that may or may not derive from legally and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance. This suggests that a working security community will not rely heavily on enforcement mechanisms (Adler and Barnett, 1998:35-38).

Further, in a security community domestic behaviour and arrangements will be consistent with those of the community. The underlying cause of this is that a common identity will be reflected both in the external behaviour of the state and in its domestic characteristics and practices.

1.3.3 Conditions

When comparing the theories of Adler and Barnett with Deutsch one finds a degree of overlap, but Adler and Barnett go further in specifying the conditions under which the development of a
transnational community might translate into pacific relations. They also differ from Deutsch in that they stress the importance of elites and organisations for integration.

1.3.3.1 Precipitating conditions

While Deutsch underlined that security communities have to be striven for as distinct a goal, Adler and Barnett claim that precipitating conditions or different catalysts can propel states to look in each other’s direction and start coordinating policies to their mutual advantage. Changes in technology, demography, economics or the environment can be such triggers. Other examples are new interpretations of social reality or an external threat.

Face to face interactions and dialogues that follow such trigger-situations can develop new social bonds. Adler and Barnett describe how the logic of “path-dependence” works: Initial choices persist because individuals and social groups come to identify and benefit from past decisions, and because the cost of change becomes more significant over time (Adler and Barnett, 1998:49).

1.3.3.2 Structural conditions

Adler and Barnett identify two basic structural conditions for a security community. These to some extent correspond to Deutsch’s background conditions.

1) Power: Strong political units form the core of a security community by conventional power to coerce and, alternatively, by authority to define a “we feeling”. A core state can become a magnet for others. It may have the ability to create meanings and categories of legitimate action and to get other actors to commit to these rules.

2) Knowledge: Shared meanings and understandings that constitute and constrain state action by representing categories of practical action and legitimate activity is a structural condition for a security community. In other words, the members of a security community need a common set of inter-subjective ideas. Further, these ideas need to be such that they promote practices that facilitate mutual trust and identity and, most importantly, conflict resolution.

1.3.3.3 Process conditions

Adler and Barnett identify three process conditions:

1) Transaction density: A qualitative and quantitative growth of transactions among the members of the security community reshapes collective experience and transforms social facts.

2) International organisations and institutions: Although some security communities have developed without institutional frameworks, international organisations and institutions can contribute directly and indirectly to the formation of security communities. Organisations can be viewed as structures that constrain state action, but they can also be depicted as a process; interaction in organisations and institutions can promote mutual trust and identity. Institutions establish norms of behaviour. Moreover, they can encourage actors to discover their preferences, reconceptualise who they are and re-imagine their social bonds. Within organisations political actors can learn about each other’s interpretations and normative understandings, this in turn can lead them to
identify with each other. Institutions can also “engineer” cultural homogeneity, belief in common norms, and the idea of a common fate. Deutsch did not pay much attention to the role of political elites in creating innovative institutions. Adler and Barnett stress the importance of creative and farsighted leaders that use the propensities that lie in organisations to promote visions and turn these visions into political reality.

3) Social learning: Social learning represents the capacity and motivation of social actors to manage and even transform reality by changing their beliefs of the material and social world and their identities. Again Adler and Barnett stress the importance of this capacity in the political elite. Social learning explains why transactions and interactions in institutions and organisations encourage trust and mutual identity. Through transactions actors communicate who they are and their view of the world and through this there can occur changes in individual and collective understandings and values. Further, institutions can affect the choice of values and promote the diffusion of certain epistemic understandings from country to country and from generation to generation. A last point is that norms that are being promoted by a core power with material strength and international legitimacy, give them a certain authority that enhances their diffusion through social learning. This means that social learning often occurs in the context of power asymmetries.

In sum both structural and process conditions contribute to the development of mutual trust and a collective identity. Further, as Deutsch, Adler and Barnett underline the importance of interaction between structural and process conditions for the formation of a security community. However, a major difference between Adler and Barnett and Deutsch seems to be that Adler and Barnett don’t emphasize the importance of mutual responsiveness for the creation of a security community.

Adler and Barnett elaborate further on the concept by outlining phases in the development of a security community. However, in our case these phases seem irrelevant, as what we are looking at is merely the possible seed of a security community.

2 THE RUSSIAN-WESTERN CASE

To begin with we will spell out some circumstances that are special for the Russian-Western case, and therefore define the focus of our study.

1) Small beginnings. The current relation between Russia and the West seems to be little more than an ad hoc alliance in the face of what is perceived as a common threat and it is possible that this alliance endures only as long as the threat endures. A lack of trust and responsiveness has no doubt dominated the Russian-Western relationship. Many historians claim that the perceived threat from the West has determined the course of Russian history from the early Moscovite state through the Russian empire, the Soviet period and to this day. The impact of the cold war-heritage, including a mutual perception of the other as an “Empire of evil” together with the near total lack of transnational ties, should not be underestimated. Today there is no Russian-Western security community and the chances of one in the near future are dependent on developments in
both the West and Russia that are more unlikely than likely. However, there seems to be an impetus in the direction of growing trust and cooperation between Russia and the West. The ambition for the project is thus to trace possible beginnings of such a security community, but also to identify what the main obstacles actually are.

2) Post-imperial heritage. The fact that Russia is a “post-imperial state” and that the newly independent states border on Russia, provides an extra complex context for a potential Russian-Western security community. Russia has been closely integrated with these countries. Large Russian diasporas still exist in many of them, as well as military bases and troops. In the case of Belarus Russia is even forging a union. Parallel to this the West is seeking increased influence in these areas, which Russia clearly considers its legitimate sphere of interest. The uncertainty about Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in the former Soviet states and the potential competition for influence in this area undoubtedly constitutes a major challenge to the development of a Russian-Western security community. On this background the project will focus not only on the direct relationship between Russia and the West, but on their interaction in and over Russia’s near abroad: 1) The Russian-Western relationship in the north, with special focus on how Russian-Norwegian controversies mirror this relationship. 2) The Russian-Western relationship in the Ukraine and Belarus 3) The Russian-Western relationship in the Caucasus and Central Asia, with special focus on the strategic competition for influence in the region and the war in Chechnya.

3) Interests. During the Cold War the Russian-Western relationship was dominated by constantly colliding interests and extremely high levels of mutual threat perception. The interests of Russia and the West more often coincide after 1991, however there are still many conflicts of interests and new will be added. What kind of challenge does this pose for a prospective Russian-Western security community? Bearing in mind the theoretical propositions outlined above it is clear that being part of the same security community does not imply that interests always coincide. Even if the precipitating condition for the development of a security community might be common interests, perpetually coinciding interests are not a precondition for security communities. Rather, the “test” of a security community is how the states interact when interests collide. Do they resort to threats and violence or do they seek to settle their differences through bargaining and cooperation? For our project this implies that we will pay special attention to the relation between Russia and the West in situations where they have conflicting interests. This will also make it possible to draw some conclusions as to how conflicts of interests affect the growth of a security community.

Below Deutsch’s and Adler and Barnett’s theoretical propositions will be used to outline conditions and obstacles for a prospective Western-Russian security community. We do not, however, perceive the set of conditions as a row of independent variables in a strict causal chain, but more as a heuristic frame that generates useful questions. The set of conditions will
serve as a frame for all the case-studies in the project, but some case-studies will deal specifically with one or a few of the conditions.

2.1 Determination and precipitating conditions.

To start out we will adopt both Deutsch’s point that a security community needs to be striven for as a distinct goal and Adler and Barnett’s idea that precipitating conditions or triggers can kick off a security community by forcing the parties to look in each other’s direction.

2.1.1 Determination

*Do Russia and the West want a Russian-Western security community?*

During the last Gorbachev-years the Soviet Union undertook a dramatic change in foreign policy orientation. The West was no longer portrayed as an enemy, the “empire” in Eastern Europe was dismantled peacefully and the Soviet Union unilaterally took steps to reduce arms and troops. This was something short of a revolution and the elites who had given birth to the “New Thinking” of the Gorbachev era had wanted the transformation of the Soviet Union into a democratic society integrated into the Western community of nations. Accordingly, many pictured the new Russian state as developing into a “normal European state” after 1991 and hoped to see Russia as part of a Western security community. This, however, did not happen. Already in 1992/93 it became clear that this orientation would not persist. Russia could and should not cater to every whim of the West, especially when the West repeatedly failed to take Russian interests into account. Hence, Russia’s foreign policy was reoriented toward what one talked of as “the national interest.” This adjustment came not only because many felt that Russia had neglected core interests and responsibilities, but also because many were convinced that Russia’s adoption of a European identity wasn’t as easy and maybe not as “natural” as one had thought.

Today some in the Russian elite, most importantly Putin, seem to reorient themselves toward cooperation with the West. A crucial question to address in the project is therefore the following: Is the new orientation toward the West merely a tactical adjustment necessitated by domestic or international circumstances, or can it be interpreted as a genuine determination to integrate with the West? This question will be addressed in the project by interpreting statements and actions by the Russian elite in interaction with the West directly and in the near abroad. Further, the project will include a study of the political elite around Putin: how they see themselves and Russia and whether integration in a Russian-Western security community is something they strive for as a distinct goal? This study should also assess the “opposition” voices, their arguments against such integration and how strong they stand in relation to those advocating a Western identity and orientation.

Ever since 1991 the West has claimed that the integration of Russia into the Western market economy and political life is a primary goal. However, it remains uncertain whether the West actually wants to integrate Russia into the Western security sphere. Indeed, the lack of Western
sensitivity to Russian interests and the reluctance to give Russia access to central organisations such as NATO, seem to indicate that the West doesn’t give priority to building community with Russia. Alternatively, Western decision-makers have maybe not understood what the forging of a security community with Russia would demand of the West. The West’s determination to integrate Russia or lack thereof will not be covered directly in the project through a separate case study, but will be assessed implicitly throughout many of the case studies.

2.1.2 Precipitating conditions

At least three factors push Russia and the West to look in each other’s direction and therefore constitute precipitating conditions for the development of a security community.

1) Threat. Russia has had terrorism at the top of its list of threats long before 11 September 2002. Terrorism was central in the new Russian security concept from 2000 and has been presented as the main rationale behind Russia’s new efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia the last few years. The 11 September terror acts projected terrorism as the main threat against the West. Thus in the face of a common threat Russia and the West have been tied together with great speed and strength.

2) New interpretations of social reality. Although the perception of a common threat constitutes the most important precipitating condition for a new Russian-Western relationship, new interpretations of social reality also contribute to the reorientation. As Adler and Barnett point out “systemic changes cause populations to reconsider who they are and with whom they want to associate” (1998:416). Russia has had the chance and has tried since the fall of the Soviet Union to redefine itself as part of the West (although less after 1992). This interpretation of Russia has been reinforced during Vladimir Putin’s presidency. He has been advocating Russia’s European identity, depicting a new geographical space where Russia is part of the West and encouraging new forms of interaction within this space.

3) Economy. Russia’s broken economy has forced Russia to adopt a Western economic system and seek economic cooperation with the West. The Russian economy has been and will be a factor that pushes Russia to look in the direction of the West and coordinate its policies with the West. However, the Western countries are not dependent on Russia economically and hence Russia’s urge to cooperate in this field is not necessarily reciprocated.

These factors have undoubtedly triggered closer cooperation and communication between Russia and Western countries. The crucial question is, however, to what extent these new ties will be followed by tighter integration in terms of identity and trust.
2.2 Background conditions

2.2.1 Power and responsiveness

A security community develops around a core power. The Western countries are already a security community and the U.S., because of its stronger military and economic power, is the core state of the Western security community. Although there are smaller security communities within the Western security community, such as the Nordic countries and that of the Western European countries, we will focus on the West as a unit in relation to Russia. This does not mean, however, that we will neglect the question of possible problems within the Western security community, for example as a consequence of growing American unilateralism nor of the possible difference in approach to Russia in Europe and the US.

The West, with the U.S. as the strongest state, will no doubt constitute the core of a Russian-Western security community. The West is clearly the stronger power, militarily, economically and politically. The ability of the West, and especially the U.S., to form the core of a Russian-Western security community is, however, not primarily dependent on it’s ability to coerce, but foremost on it’s ability to form a “we-feeling” and become a magnet for Russia.

In Deutsch’s terminology the West’s responsiveness towards Russia, through bilateral relations and through central organisations such as NATO, will be decisive for the development of a Russian-Western security community. If integration with the West really is a top priority for Putin and in a situation where he faces strong domestic opposition to this vision, Western responsiveness to Russia will be vital. Putin will need to show that integration with the West pays off.

In our study we shall give this part of Deutsch’s theory ample space. When studying the interaction between the West and Russia (especially in conflict-situations) we will investigate to what extent the parties (especially the West) are able to respond to each other’s needs and give each other’s messages adequate weight in decision-making. The West’s ability to be responsive to Russian interests and messages will be mirrored both in interaction through organisations such as NATO and EU and in different single events that affect both Russian and Western interests, such as a war on Iraq.

In the project we will also identify main obstacles to a relation of mutual responsiveness between Russia and the West. Possible obstacles are:

1) Increasing American unilateralism and the tendency to display power instead of projecting purpose. In other words, the West might prove unable to form a responsive core. Both in the question of NATO-expansion and in the Kosovo-crisis the West has been unable to convince Russia of its ability to take Russian messages and interests into account. This can very well be a problem in the future also.
2) Lack of power-asymmetry. Both Deutsch and Adler and Barnett claim that power-asymmetry is conducive to the formation of a security community. One problem in the Russian-Western case could be that the relation is not asymmetric enough. This fact has both material and psychological dimensions. Russia has been a political and military Great Power and has the potential to become one again. Indeed, Putin’s long-term aim seems to be ‘restoring Russia’s “greatness”’. This reduces the structural pressure to join the West. Further, Russia’s self-image is that of a Great Power. Russian sensitivity on account of being a (former) Great Power and the expectation of being treated accordingly makes it difficult for Russia to perceive the West a “magnet” and accept rules defined by the West. The failure of the West to understand and be sensitive to Russia’s self-image and the way Russia defines its interests will hamper a responsive relationship between the two.

3) Possessive sovereignty. The problem of “possessive sovereignty” describes new countries’ sensitivity to possible infringement on their decision-making latitude and fear of conceding authority (Barnett and Gause, 1998:161-198). This can be a major obstacle to responsive action especially in the security sphere, because new countries, such as Russia tend to see sovereignty and security as indistinguishable.

2.2.2 Compatibility of major values

Both Deutsch and Adler and Barnett suggest that shared values are a condition for a security community. However, there is no need for a total overlap of values. The crucial point is whether the shared values are such that they promote trust and conflict resolution.

The West is already an established security community with shared norms and rules of conduct and a common identity. What are the values at the core of the Western security community? Human rights, civil liberties and political rights are at the centre of the community’s collective identity. Democratic political participation and representation, private property and market economy, and rule of law are all derived from, and justified by these rights. Many would argue that it is the practices and habits derived through market economy, democracy and the rule of law that produce norms of multilateralism. These norms govern the behaviour of members in the Western security community toward each other:

Democracies externalise their internal norms when cooperating with each other. Power asymmetries should be mediated by norms of democratic decision making among equals emphasizing persuasion, compromise, and the non-use of force and coercion...Norms of regular consultation, of joint consensus building, and non hierarchy should legitimize and enable allied influence (Riise Kappen, Thomas 1995 in Schimmelpfennig 1999; 215).

Although Adler and Barnett stress that liberal-democratic values are not necessarily the only possible basis for a security community, it is reasonable to think that these values would form the core of a Russian-Western security community if there will ever be one. Firstly, these values have proved conducive to the formation of security communities. Secondly, these values constitute the West’s identity and the West is clearly the stronger part in the Russian-Western relation for the time being. Thirdly, Russia has, despite a historically very divided
relationship to Western values, ever since 1991 proclaimed democracy, market economy, human rights and the rule of law as its core values.

In the project we will investigate Russia’s standing on democratic norms and multilateralism when interacting with the West in situations where interests collide. Bearing in mind the proposition that values, if internalised and not only applied instrumentally, will have a bearing on domestic as well as foreign policy we will also take a look at how these core values are developing in the Russian domestic sphere. Putin’s choice of path will be crucial. Although Putin seems committed to marked economy, there are signs of a growing tendency toward authoritarian methods. This is visible in his relation to the press, the regions and in the war in Chechnya. Further, the development of norms such as democracy, market economy, rule of law and human rights in Russia will depend on the existence and strength of “norm entrepreneurs”, who “having strong notions about appropriate behaviour in their community, actively build such norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:896-901). Norm entrepreneurs have some kind of organisational platforms that are constructed specifically or they use forums that are constructed for other purposes. In the Russian case such entrepreneurs, to the extent that they exist, operate more through the Duma and the presidential and governmental apparatus than through NGOs, because of the weak Russian civil society.

Although the existence/absence of values conducive to the formation of a security community seems most critical on the Russian side, we should not take for granted that all dominant values in the West promote mutual trust and peaceful conflict resolution. Moreover, values are not static. They can change. In the project we will seek to identify obstacles to the growth of values that promote mutual trust and peaceful conflict resolution. Possible obstacles are:

1) On a general level it is a problem that Russia and the West are on different levels of economic development and hence have different hierarchies of values. Russia is poor and economic growth is bound to be a top priority for Russia. Accordingly Russia operates with a modern hierarchy of values. The rich Western countries on the other hand have a post-modern hierarchy of values. They can “afford” to put values such as the protection of the environment and human rights on the top of their hierarchy. This mismatch constitutes a challenge to the Russian-Western relation. Diverging priorities give different interpretations of reality and thus may contribute to misunderstandings and conflict.

2) On the more specific level a weak Russian tradition for Western values is an obvious and often referred obstacle (see for example Pipes, Richard, 1995 or Poe, Marshall, 2001). Russia has never been a democracy; short periods of liberalisation have always been followed by autocracy. A lack of pluralism has also dominated the economic sphere; Russia never had an independent class of merchants and industrialists nor a market economy. Russia missed the renaissance and individual rights have never been important. The value “human rights” has therefore never had a strong standing in Russia. Further, these “new” values do not enter into a vacuum, but rather into a contested normative space where they have to compete with existing norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:897). Although the collapse of the Soviet Union gave
Russia a possibility to define new core values, Russia is not a clean slate. Values such as order and security have a strong standing in Russia. Accordingly the state has been viewed as the monolithic single power that could guarantee this order, pluralism has often been associated with chaos. Further, the survival of the state has been more important than individual rights. As a consequence confrontation and the use of power or force to solve conflicts seem to be more widespread methods than compromise and consensus building. Thus, the liberal democratic norms do not merely enter into competition with already existing norms; some of these existing norms may directly contradict the liberal democratic norms.

3) It is legitimate to suggest that a set of American values, clearly visible after the 11 September, might prove adverse to norms of multilateralism. It does not seem of primary importance in US relations with the outside world to mediate power asymmetries by norms of democratic decision-making, persuasion, compromise, consensus building and the use of non-force. Domestically, non-hierarchy and diversity of opinion is occasionally portrayed as a threat to American strength and unity. As the controversy over the treatment of prisoners from the war against terrorism illustrated, survival is more important than human rights and binding multilateral agreements. Indeed, maybe there is a certain compatibility of values between Russia and USA. These values, however, do not seem to promote trust and peaceful conflict resolution.

4) While nationalism has been fading in the West, it plays a major role in today’s Russia and the question of Russia’s identity remains undecided and contested (Yanov: 2001). The nationalistic forces include seemingly disparate groups as the communist party and ultra nationalists such as Alexander Prokhanov. One of the main features of this nationalism is anti-Westernism and particularly anti-Americanism. The very essence of the Russian identity they project is Russia’s distinctness from the West, particularly when it comes to values. Hence, in their eyes democracy is not natural for Russia, autocracy is. These nationalist forces, many of them indeed entrepreneurs for the values they believe in, may definitely turn out to be an obstacle to the development of liberal democratic norms in Russia. Moreover, the Western-oriented identity and norms that the Russian state embraced from 1988 to 1993 have been associated with grave social and economic problems and might therefore have less appeal than the anti-Western identity and values the nationalists promote. Ironically, the existence of this nationalistic opposition might force Putin to adopt anti-democratic measures in order to secure his Western orientation.

Although these obstacles make the prospects for growth in common values that promote trust and peaceful conflict resolution seem grim, we will not look at values and their diffusion as static and historically determined variables. This implies that growth in common values can be promoted both by domestic entrepreneurs but also through the process of interaction between the West and Russia. Ira Straus (2001) has pointed out that the Russian democratic identity’s survival will depend on validation by the West on the international level. Further, as Deutsch proposed, the members of a potential security community can, by way of tacit agreements, deprive certain incompatible values of political significance. Human rights have been a point
of controversy between Russia and the West ever since the beginning of the first war in Chechnya. After the 11 September there are signs that the West is willing to pay less attention to this particular value in its relation with Russia. It remains an open question whether incompatibility on this value constitutes a major obstacle to the development of a Russian-Western security community.

### 2.3 Process conditions

#### 2.3.1 Transaction density

The density of transactions between the Soviet-Union and the West before 1991 was probably historically low, bearing in mind that they were both modern and industrialised political units. The Soviet-Union and the West operated as two parallel systems isolated from each other both economically and politically. After the break up of the Soviet-Union the transactions between Russia and the Western countries have increased dramatically, although maybe not as much as many had expected.

In the project we will try to make an assessment of the density of transactions between Russia and the West. Although Deutsch’s concept of transactions included all kinds of transactions on every level in society, we will limit our scope to transactions among elites/the top decisionmakers. In the Russian-Western case the most probable model for the development of a security community would be the “top down” and not the “bottom up” method (Mouritzen, Hans, 2001: 304). The “top down” method implies that the vision of a security community is projected from above and promoted through common institutions. Here peaceful expectations only gradually encompass the popular level. The “bottom up” method implies that mutual trust and identity develop gradually and spontaneously at the popular level, finally depriving the decisionmakers of the option of mutual war. The possibility of a Russian-Western security community developing from the bottom up can be all but ruled out. The Russian civil society is very weak and the transnational ties to the West on the popular level are few. Today the possibilities for popular contact that Europe’s geographical proximity to Russia provides, are undermined by rather strict control of popular movement on both sides (e.g. through the Schengen agreement). Hence, a Russian-Western security community will, if ever, be forged from above. This makes transactions on the decisionmaking level, and particularly those that go on inside institutions, crucial for binding the parts together.

We will, however, not only assess the density of transactions in the political/security sphere, but also in the economic sphere. The reason for this is that growth in transactions in the economic sphere can build trust and common identity between elites and produce a spill-over effect into the political sphere. This is a particularly relevant proposition in the Russian case, where political and economic elites are closely intertwined. Accordingly, we will assess:

1) The density both of institutionalised transactions and non-institutionalised transactions in the economic sphere. Institutionalised transactions: membership in G8, IMF and the World
Bank; negotiations with WTO and OECD. Non-institutionalised transactions: investments, joint venture, trade.

2) The density of both institutionalised transactions and non-institutionalised transactions in the political sphere. Institutionalised transactions: membership in OSCE and the European Council; dialogue with EU and NATO (PfP, EAPC, NACC, PJC and now the new 20-member NATO-Russia Council). Non-institutionalised transactions: summits and direct contacts on the decisionmaking level.

We do not attempt to arrive at any detailed measure of transaction density between Russia and the West. Our aim is simply to arrive at a rough conclusion as to how dense transactions between Russia and the West are in comparison to transactions between the Western countries and whether this density is growing.

If the density is limited, what are the reasons? Here clearly the interplay with the conditions power/responsiveness and compatibility of values must be assessed.

2.3.2 International organisations and social learning

Assessing the density of transactions between Russia and the West will give us a rough quantitative measure. However, the essential aspect of transactions, according to the theory, is the result it produces in form of a qualitative change in people’s attitudes, norms and identity. According to Adler and Barnett organisations and institutions make up the main arena for such processes. The Russian and the Western elite now interact in many different organisations and institutions and we cannot possibly study the whole scene. Rather, we shall look closer at the interaction between Russia and the West as a developing process of social learning in two organisations: NATO and the EU.

Why NATO and EU? Although NATO does not encompass Russia, as for example the OSCE does, it clearly plays the key role in European and Western security and it is the institutional manifestation of the Western security community. Further, through PfP it embraces not only all of Europe, but also all former Soviet states. Russia has had institutional links with NATO through NACC (1991) and the Permanent Joint Council (1997). In the new Nato-Russia Council, which was established in 2002, Russia will sit as an equal member with the nineteen NATO countries for discussion on a select list of security issues. On this background Russian-Western interaction through NATO’s institutional framework will be a key arena for prospective diffusion of common norms and identity.

Relations between Russia and the European Union are also of vital importance to European security. The European Union now accounts for more than 35 percent of Russia’s foreign trade. This would rise to 50 percent when the Union absorbs new members from the former Soviet bloc. Russia–EU relations are considered to be developing successfully and to have good prospects. The 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the European Union has been complemented by two unilaterally adopted “strategies” addressed by
each side to the other. The EU’s “Common Strategy” paper makes clear that the Union is prepared to cooperate with Russia to ensure a stable, democratic, and prosperous Russia in a united Europe. It offers help in consolidating the Russian democracy and the rule of law and in integrating Russia into a common economic and social space.

In line with Adler and Barnett’s theoretical propositions, the main objective of this part of the project will be to study if and how interaction through EU and NATO’s institutional framework has produced changes in the attitudes, interests and identities of the elite (on both sides) through a process of social learning, and if and how they in turn have sought to push forward integration. Central questions will be: Have transactions through EU and NATO’s institutional framework promoted a greater understanding between Russia and the West and thus promoted trust? Do the Russian and Western elites who interact in the EU and NATO frameworks have a growing feeling that they share a common fate? Have established norms of behaviour been transmitted to Russia through cooperation in EU and NATO?

Again, we will try to identify possible obstacles to EU and NATO’s role as arenas for social learning and trust building. Clearly, one such obstacle could be the Cold War-identity of NATO. NATO was established as the West’s weapon against the perceived Soviet threat. This affects Russians’ perceptions of NATO. NATO’s lack of legitimacy in Russian eyes may hamper the diffusion of norms through social learning. NATO’s cold war identity also affects the way Western bureaucrats and defence-staff in NATO view Russians. While Russian membership in either NATO or the European Union is not formally ruled out, its prospects are usually downplayed as irrelevant for the foreseeable future. Much will depend on the nature and speed of Russia’s domestic transformation. Positive changes do not come automatically. Failure on the part of Russia to satisfy European standards regarding human rights and democracy could significantly delay the integration process, leaving Russia outside NATO and the European Union. The feeling of being excluded could easily lead to self-isolation and thus limit the density of transactions between Russia and the West.

In line with the theoretical propositions, we will focus on the interplay between this process condition, social learning, and background conditions such as responsiveness and common values. Responsiveness and common values will affect the outcome of the socialisation process that goes on within NATO’s institutional framework. A lack of responsiveness on the side of Western actors in this organisation will no doubt hamper the growth a common identity and the diffusion of Western values to Russia.

### 2.4 Indicators

Finding adequate indicators for the existence, or the beginnings, of a security community is a difficult task. The reason is that a security community is constituted more by psychological bonds than by institutional. Accordingly, a security community can exist between states although there are no institutional manifestations of it. Even if institutional arrangements are established, the security community may already have existed for a long time.
However, as Adler and Barnett suggested a security community exists when states neither expect nor prepare for war and when there exists deeply entrenched habits of peaceful resolution of conflict. We shall therefore look for indicators of a security community both in concrete actions/steps taken by Russia and the West and in the words that reveal perceptions and attitudes. What follows is merely a list of possible indicators.

1) On the level of concrete manifestations:
- Changes in military spending and deployment
- Changes in military doctrines and planning
- Increasing security cooperation, such as sharing of security information
- Eventually a dismantling of verification and monitoring arrangements
- Type of response when interests are threatened
- Resolution of previous points of dispute
- Adherence to agreements
- Institutionalisation and organisation of cooperation

2) On the level of narratives:
- Statements
- Speeches
- Dialogues

Interpreting these narratives will imply assessing what the actors say. However, it will also imply not always taking what people say at face value, but trying to interpret what their true perceptions and intentions are. This will often be visible when comparing words with deeds.

Key indicators of growing trust and identity on this level would be:
- They no longer perceive/define each other as a threat.
- They understand/express understanding for each other’s interpretation of a given situation, especially when interests collide.
- They locate themselves within a shared or congruent storyline, both in their expressions and in their perceptions.
- They perceive/express adherence to certain norms as crucial, this can be seen through how they justify action.
- They no longer perceive/express that the use of force is an option to solving problems.

As already mentioned we will pay special attention to the situations where Russian and Western interests seem to collide or usually have collided. Conflict situations will reveal the degree of trust and identity between Russia and the West. If such conflicts constantly produce a fallback to statism and threats instead negotiated solutions and continued cooperation, the Russian-Western relationship is far from a security community.
2.5 Model
Precipitating conditions
Determination

↓

Background conditions:
- Power and responsiveness
- Compatibility of major values

↓ ↑

Process conditions:
- Transaction density
- International organisations and social learning

↓

Mutual trust and identity,
Indicated in actions, words and perceptions.

3 CONCLUSION
Through applying the concept of security communities to the Russian-Western case we hope to be able to arrive at a characterisation of the relationship. We also hope to indicate in which direction this relationship most probably will move: whether the small beginnings of cooperation will grow into dependable expectations of peaceful change or fade and leave us with Russia as an uncertain potential threat for years to come.

As the framework presented here suggests the key to a Russian-Western security community lays not only in Russia’s ability to stick to the Westward orientation, complete democratic reform and adopt Western norms, but just as much in the West’s determination to integrate Russia and respond to Russian messages and needs.

If the West proves incapable of serving the function of a responsive core and Russia incapable of defining its identity and core values in congruence with the West, we may well see two parallel security systems developing again. Although Russia for the time being is too weak to forge a security community in the post-Soviet space with itself as the core state, the failure of a Russian-Western project might spur Russia to opt for this alternative in the long run.
References


**DISTRIBUTION LIST**

**FFISYS**  
**Dato:** 22. november 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAPPORTTYPE (KRYSS AV)</th>
<th>RAPPORT NR.</th>
<th>REFERANSE</th>
<th>RAPPORTENS DATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>2002/04917</td>
<td>FFISYS/847/161.1</td>
<td>22. november 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RAPPORTENS BESKYTTELSESGRAD**  
Unclassified

**RAPPORTENS TITTEL**  
A RUSSIAN-WESTERN SECURITY COMMUNITY?  
Possibilities and obstacles

**FORFATTER(E)**  
WILHELMSEN Julie

---

**EKSTERN FORDELING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANTALL</th>
<th>EKS NR</th>
<th>TIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Forsvarsdepartementet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>V/Kjærsti Klæboe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>V/Jan Fløte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Utenriksdepartementet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>V/Erik Svedal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>FO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>FO/FST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>V/Kommandørkaptein Geir Myrset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>FHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>V/Oberstløytnant Finn Horvei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>FSTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>V/Oberstløytnant Harald Håvoll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>IFS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Den Norske Atlantershavskomite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>NUPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>V/Helge Blakksrud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fridtjof Nansens Institutt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>PRIO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INTERN FORDELING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANTALL</th>
<th>EKS NR</th>
<th>TIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>FFI-Bibl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adm direktør/stabssjef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>FFIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>FFISYS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>FFIBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>FFIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Restopplag til Biblioteket</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ELEKTRONISK FORDELING:**

Ragnvald H Solstrand (RHS)  
Bent Erik Bakken (BEB)  
Jan Erik Torp (JET)  
Bjørn Olav Knudsen (BOK)  
Thomas Hegghammer (ThH)  
Laila Bokhari (LB)  
Tore Nyhamar (TN)  
Iver Johansen (IJ)  
Brynjar Lia (BL)  
Tor Bukkvoll (TB)  
Kristian Åtland (KAt)  
Julie Wilhelmsen (JuW)  
Anders Kjølberg (AKj)  
FFI-veven

Benytt ny side om nødvendig.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANTALL</th>
<th>EKS NR</th>
<th>TIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FAFO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Universitetet i Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Institutt for Statsvitenskap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>V/Anton Steen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutt for østeuropeiske og orientalske studier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>V/Pål Kolstø</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        |        | Universitetet i Tromsø |
| 1      | 1      | V/Arne Kommisrud |

|        |        | Universitetet i Trondheim |
| 1      | 1      | Institutt for sosioologi og statsvitenskap |
|        |        | V/Nils Petter Gleditsh |

|        |        | Universitetet i Bergen |
| 1      |        | Institutt for sammenlignende politikk |

|        |        | FOI |
| 1      |        | SE-172 90 Stockholm |

|        |        | Försvarshögskolan |
| 1      |        | V/Nils Rekkedal |
|        |        | Boks 27805 |
|        |        | SE-11593 |